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Abstract
This article undertakes the issue of the Mahāyāna Buddhist concept of tathāgatagarbha, seen as 
a form of selfhood. Its task lies in outlining the methods employed to disclose tathāgatagarbha 
as a “true” and “original” – but also utterly Buddhist – form of self. In the first part of the ar-
ticle I demonstrate the stance of sūtras from the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra group, in which 
tathāgatagarbha is bluntly termed ātman, and which posit that all ideas of selfhood are deriva-
tives of the notion of tathāgatagarbha. In the second part, where the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra is taken 
under consideration, I introduce an interpretative strategy that shows how this scripture establish-
es tathāgatagarbha as an enduring self. This is done mainly by assigning the tathāgatagarbha 
a function of sustaining the diachronic coherence of sentient beings in saṃsāra. Consequently, 
tathāgatagarbha can be viewed as a “prototype” for the idea of “base consciousness” (ālayavijñāna). 
The final part of the article is built around the question of why Śrīmālādevī-sūtra warns against as-
cribing the label ātman to tathāgatagarbha.
Key words: Buddhism, Mahāyāna, self, buddha nature, ātman, tathāgatagarbha, Mahāparinirvāṇa-
mahāsūtra, Śrīmālādevī-sūtra 
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1. Introduction*
According to a widely accepted classification, the most important sūtras of the 
tathāgatagarbha tradition can be assigned to two main groups. The first consists 
of the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (TGS), the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśaparivarta (AAN), 
* I would like to express my gratitude to Chris V. Jones from the University of Oxford for sending 
me his unpublished conference paper (The Term Ātman in Mahāyāna Tathāgatagarbha Thought). Parts 2 
& 3 of this article follow his research presented therein. (An expanded version of Jones’s paper, entitled 
The Self-Aggrandizing Vehicle: Tathāgatagarbha, Tīrthikas, and the True Self, “Journal of International
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and the Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra (ŚMS). It is assumed that they were created 
in this very order.1 The second group of the tathāgatagarbha “canon” is named after 
the Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra (MPNS), and also contains the Mahāmeghasūtra 
(MMS), the *Mahābherīhārakasūtra (MBhS), and the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra (AMS). 
These scriptures share a number of doctrinal similarities and are bound by a proph-
ecy made 700 years after the Buddha’s parinirvāṇa. It concerns a number of 
tathāgatagarbha scriptures that are said to have emerged 40 years after the passing 
of Śākyamuni and then disappeared, only to come to light again 80 years before the 
700-year mark in the southern part of India, at the time of the Śātavāhana dynasty 
(48–181 CE).2
There are several topics discussed frequently, but in varying proportions, in the 
sūtras of the MPNS group. Among them we can include the notion of the eternity of 
the Buddha, the secret teachings on the parinirvāṇa, and the prophecy connected with 
it, a discussion on the icchantikas, the recognising of Mahākāśyapa as the true heir to 
the Dharma, and the promotion of faith (xin 信) as a means indispensable for achiev-
ing liberation.3 The Mahāparinirvāṇa group also shares with many Mahāyāna sūtras 
a general depreciation of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. However, its most striking 
doctrinal component must be the identification of tathāgatagarbha or *buddhadhātu 
with ātman (wo 我) / ātmadhātu (wojie 我界).4 The TGS group represents a less 
unambiguous approach to this matter. This issue will be treated in more detail below.
It must be noted that both groups share a set of ideas that are fundamental, al-
though not exclusive, to the tathāgatagarbha “canon.” These are the notion of the 
decline of Dharma (MPNS group, ŚMS, AAN), the idea of sattvadhātu (the sphere of 
living beings equal to dharmakāya, AAN, MBhS, AMS), ekadhātu (reality as a single 
realm, AAN, AMS), ekayāna (one vehicle leading to enlightenment, MBhS, ŚMS), 
and the notion of prakṛtipariśuddhacitta – an inherently pure mind covered by ad-
ventitious defilements (āgantukakleśa) (AAN, ŚMS).5
Until recently, all claims regarding the chronology of the texts in question were 
based on the research of Takasaki (1975), who considered TGS, ŚMS, and AAN to be 
not only closely related, but also the oldest of all tathāgatagarbha sūtras. Their rela-
tionship seems to be confirmed by Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), the main śāstra of the 
tathāgatagarbha tradition, which quotes them extensively, and in fact builds many 
of its doctrinal themes around notions drawn from ŚMS. The views of Takasaki were 
Association of Buddhist Studies” 2017, vol. 39, pp. 115–170, appeared when the present study was al-
ready completed). I am also very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for many highly valuable remarks 
and emendations.
1 According to J.A. Silk, the manner of presentation of crucial ideas (sattvadhātu, tathāgatagarbha, 
dharmakāya) in the AAN validates placing this sūtra chronologically after TGS and ŚMS (idem, Bud-
dhist Cosmic Unity, Hamburg 2015, pp. 10–13).
2 M. Radich, The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra and the Emergence of Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine, 
Hamburg 2015, p. 75.
3 This is also a strong notion in the ŚMS and RGV (see fn. 40).
4 M. Radich, Tathāgatagarbha Sūtras [in:] Brill’s Encyclopedia of Buddhism, vol. 1: Literature and 
Languages, J. Silk et al. (eds.), Leiden 2015, p. 269.
5 Ibidem, pp. 269–270.
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held up by M. Zimmermann in his influential study of the TGS (2002), in which he 
argued that this text might be the first to put forward the idea of tathāgatagarbha as 
“buddha within.” However, according to the latest research of S. Hodge (2012) and 
M. Radich (2015), the status of the oldest tathāgatagarbha text should be assigned 
to MPNS. There is strong evidence that enables us to place the creation of the oldest 
strata of the MPNS at the beginning of the first millennium under the rule of the late 
Śātavāhana dynasty. This, most definitely, puts MPNS well before any of the texts 
from the TGS group.6
The two bodies of texts are best differentiated by their approach to the notion 
of tathāgatagarbha and by relating this notion to the idea of a subjective princi-
ple usually termed ātman. In TGS, tathāgatagarbha should be read as a bahuvrīhi 
compound denoting living beings having a tathāgata, or in fact being nothing other 
than a buddha. However, in texts which equate tathāgatagarbha with *buddhadhātu, 
this expression is best read as a tatpuruṣa compound denoting living beings in pos-
session of a buddha-embryo, i.e. a separate entity inside beings.7 The recognition 
of tathāgatagarbha as ātman in the MPNS group not only constitutes a substantial 
departure from the usual Buddhist anātmavāda approach, but also differentiates this 
text from the TGS group, in which such equation is absent. In a sūtra as rudimentary 
as TGS, no explicit mentions of tathāgatagarbha as a self are made. The same can 
be said about AAN. Nevertheless, the question of tathāgatagarbha being a kind of 
ātman-like principle is tackled by ŚMS, albeit in a manner different from that intro-
duced by MPNS.
2.  Tathāgatagarbha as a true self in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-
mahāsūtra and *Mahābherīhāraka-sūtra
In MPNS, the idea of “buddha within” (buddha nature) is expressed with the term 
*buddhadhātu, which is equivalent to tathāgatagarbha.8 This stresses the connection 
6 The date of TGS was set as some time before 350 CE by M. Zimmermann (A Buddha Within: The 
Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, Tokyo 2002, pp. 77–84). According to A. Wayman, ŚMS was composed around 
the third century CE (A. Wayman, H. Wayman, The Lion’s Roar of Queen Śrīmālā, Delhi 1990, p. 3).
7 M. Radich, The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra..., pp. 25–27; C.V. Jones, Beings, Non-Beings, 
and Buddhas: Contrasting Notions of Tathāgatagarbha in the Anu natvāpūrṇatvamrdeśaparivarta and 
*Mahābherī Sūtra, “Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies” 2016, vol. 10, pp. 53–54.
8 In MPNS the concept of buddha nature was formed partly under the influence of the MMS. It was 
a process also connected with the change of the authorship of MPNS. In the first phase, the initial group 
of authors (dharmakathikas [“dharma preachers”]) defined the notion of ātman as simply the tathāgata’s 
dharmakāya, and gave it the characteristics of being eternal, almighty, and unconditioned. According to 
the theory of Suzuki Takayasu, at that point the tathāgata was not yet treated as an individual self. MMS 
defined ātman in the same manner, but added the attribute of “non-emptiness” (cf. tathāgatagarbha as 
śūnya-aśūnya in ŚMS). Inspired by MMS, the second group of MPNS authors (bodhisattvas), having 
accepted this quality, characterised the tathāgata-ātman further as embodied and immanent. Only then 
was it possible to internalise the tathāgata (or, more precisely, the tathāgata’s relics) as tathāgatagarbha / 
*buddhadhātu (see note below), T. Suzuki, The Recompilation of the Mahāparinirvaṇasūtra Under the 
Influence of the Mahāmeghasūtra, “Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies” 2001, vol. 49, no. 2; see 
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of the said concept with the idea of buddha relics (*buddhadhātu = śarīradhātu).9 In 
MPNS,10 we find an explicit passage that may be regarded as the purest example of 
assigning the character and function of self to buddha nature. It is a clear reference 
to the omnipresent topos of tathāgatagarbha present in all beings, but covered with 
various mental stains, i.e. being available, but not (yet) manifested.
The Buddha addressed Kāśyapa: the true (zhenshi 眞實) self (wo 我) is the buddha nature (rulai 
xing 如來性). It should be understood that all living beings have it, but in those beings covered 
with immeasurable afflictions (fannao 煩惱), it is not visible.11
The pedagogical stance of the sūtra is revealed when it explains how the 
*buddhadhātu teachings fit into the scheme of the skill-in-means method. It turns out, 
that – contrary to what might seem intuitive – it is the “orthodox” teachings of no-self 
(anātman) that should be regarded as skill-in-means (upāya). It is said that the prac-
tice (xiu 修) of cultivating non-self (wuwo 無我) of all the dharmas was taught by the 
Buddha in order to teach and guide (you 誘) sentient beings (T376_12:0883c02–4). 
This particular upāya is efficient in leading beings to enlightenment, because when 
practising non-self, they are able to enter nirvāṇa (883c04–5). It is then explicitly 
stated that the doctrine of non-self is an upāya, because the concept of anātman is 
named a skilful (fangbian 方便) and secret (mi 密) teaching, exposed in order to re-
move the notion of a “worldly self” (suwo 俗我). Only after revealing this teaching 
was the Buddha able to expound the nature of the tathāgata (rulai xing 如來性); it 
is this very nature that is termed a true (zhen 眞) and transcendent (lishi 離世) self 
(883c05–6).
One may observe here that the “orthodox” view of non-self is helpful insofar as 
it removes the erroneous notions of a mundane self (i.e. the non-Buddhist ātman) 
and leads to nirvāṇa. But for the complete understanding of what (or who) actually 
enjoys enlightenment it is indispensable to know the true nature of all beings. It can 
also be inferred that on the saṃsāric plane there exists only a false idea of self that 
must be countered with the teachings of anātman. However, on the supramundane 
level there is a pure form of selfhood: a tathāgata enjoying the bliss of liberation. 
This being so, we must underline that in MPNS the term ātman is used to denote both 
notions of false and true selfhood. Here one must avoid the simplistic conclusion that 
the tendency to use this term constitutes a kind of “Brahmanic bent” of the MPNS. 
also idem, The Buddhology in the Mahābherīsūtra Inherited from the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, “Journal of 
Indian and Buddhist Studies” 2002, vol. 50, no. 2, p. 1015.
9 According to the now widely accepted theory of Shimoda Masahiro, the veneration of the bud-
dha relics ([śarīra]dhātu) in a stūpa was reworked by the authors of the MPNS into a reverence for the 
buddha-principle or nature (buddhdhātu / tathāgatagarbha) within all living beings. Some aspects of 
Shimoda’s theory in English are available in S. Sasaki, The Mahāparinirvaṇa Sūtra and the Origins 
of Mahāyāna Buddhism, “Japanese Journal of Religious Studies” 1999, vol. 26, no. 1–2, pp. 192–193; 
see also J. Takasaki, The Tathāgatagarbha Theory Reconsidered, “Japanese Journal of Religious Studies” 
2000, vol. 27, no. 1–2, pp. 79–81; M. Radich, The Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra..., pp. 94–95, 159–168.
10 Faxian’s and Buddhabhadra’s translation from c. 416–418 CE (Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō [T] 
vol. 12, no. 376).
11 MPNS T376_12:883b15–17: 佛告迦葉。眞實我者是如來性。當知一切衆生悉有。但彼衆生
無量煩惱覆蔽不現。
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It is rather the effect of a conscious strategy of redefining the origins and history of 
the concept and the term ātman that enabled authors of MPNS to use it freely. This 
matter will be discussed below. But first let us turn briefly to another sūtra from 
the MPNS group in order to illustrate a slightly different approach to the idea of 
tathāgatagarbha as ātman.
In MBhS, terms like sattvadhātu, tathāgatagarbha, and ātman are used to indi-
cate the nature of all living beings equal in essence to that of a buddha. The meaning 
of sattvadhātu in this sūtra is restricted to an essential component (dhātu) in beings, 
and lacks the interpretation as “sphere of beings” so characteristic of AAN.12 It is 
therefore not surprising that one of the focal points of MBhS is bodhi, understood 
as the emancipation of a self. MBhS holds that enlightenment constitutes a state 
of supremacy or sovereignty (zi zai 自在) impossible to attain in saṃsāra, and 
subsequently posits that being able to experience such supremacy means having 
a permanent (chang 常) self that undergoes liberation “with a form” (youse 有色) 
(T270_12:296c06–10).13 This liberation with supremacy always pertains to the true 
form of self, i.e. tathāgatagarbha, which has to be distinguished from a false self 
bound by saṃsāra, and therefore devoid of supremacy. MBhS explicitly states that, 
as long as beings wander in saṃsāra, the self does not attain sovereignty, and for 
that reason the teaching of anātman is needed to underline the lack of a permanent 
self in the cycle of transmigration (296b22–24, 296c18–20).14 We can see that this 
sūtra, just like the MPNS, acknowledges the need to posit a permanent self identical 
to tathāgatagarbha and an illusory self which represents the false idea of what self-
hood really is, i.e. the buddha (or buddha-embryo) within. Nonetheless, for both texts 
the ātman remains a proper term for designating every kind of self.
3.  Mistaken notions of self in Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra  
and Anġulimālīya-sūtra
Having already established the proper notion of self and the notion of non-self as 
skilful means, MPNS goes on to elaborate on the misapprehension of the true self 
by non-Buddhists. Again it is said that Buddha expounded the doctrine of anātman 
in order to wean people away from the mistaken teachings of the tīrthikas (waidao 
外道) (non-Buddhist thinkers), who accepted the wrong notions of a mundane self 
(ātman, sattva, jīva) (T376_12:863a7–9). In a parable, the behaviour of tīrthikas is 
likened to that of a woodworm accidentally leaving a trail which resembles real let-
ters (862c15–17). Those who posit an erroneous notion of self are like that worm. By 
accident they stumbled upon something valuable – the buddha nature, a proper self 
– but mistook it for something else, i.e. the notion of ātman.
12 C.V. Jones, Beings, Non-Beings..., p. 66. For the idea of sattvadhātu as “realm of beings” and its 
implications see J.A. Silk, op. cit., pp. 14–51.
13 Translation of Guṇabhadra (T vol. 12, no. 270).
14 C.V. Jones, Beings, Non-Beings..., pp. 69–71.
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The latter part of the sūtra states that Buddha’s original teachings on self were not 
understood by his audiences. The deluded listeners (tīrthikas) misinterpreted these 
original teachings and gave rise to notions of sattva, ātman, pudgala, and jīva, or 
a self that is like a lamp the size of a thumb resident in the heart (887c9–12). Here it is 
clear that the teachings uttered by the Buddha were distorted over the course of time. 
The effect of this distortion encompasses various Brahmanic notions of selfhood, 
including the ideas of self found in the Upaniṣads. In AMS, *buddhadhātu is often 
substituted by the term ātmadhātu, svadhātu, or simply dhātu. The scripture lists 
many mistaken notions of self: empirical ones (sattvadhātu, ātman, jīva, pudgala, 
manuja, mānava) as well as more subtle ones (self the size of a thumb, the size of 
a millet grain, the size of a hem or sesame seed, self as a heart of a lamp).15
AMS also presents a parable on the possible origin of all these wrong notions. It 
involves the son of Buddha Gautama, Rāhula, inspecting water for insects. Looking 
into the water, he sees something, but is not entirely sure if it is insects or tiny particles 
of some sort. His behaviour is compared to that of a bodhisattva on the tenth bhūmi, 
who is scrutinising his own nature, and, while trying to understand what he sees, 
generates many different views. This supports the idea that for the unenlightened be-
ings there is no proper notion of a self, i.e. right comprehension of tathāgatagarbha, 
which is hard to realise (nanru 難入) and attainable only for a fully awakened bud-
dha (T120_2:525b24–28).16 In this parable, we see an alternative source for the vari-
ous conceptions of self. They are apparently the works of bodhisattvas who try to 
grasp the idea of tathāgatagarbha and teach it to others, but do so incorrectly. All the 
same, just like in the MPNS, the source of these many notions of self lies within 
the Mahāyāna. In this way, all the mistaken models of salvation surrounding the vari-
ous notions of self present themselves as distorted versions of buddhadharma.
In the end, investigating the aforementioned sūtras leaves us with two conclu-
sions that are valuable for further research. First of all, the concept of self (ātman) is 
an invention of Buddhist tathāgatagarbha scriptures. Their authors adopted a high-
ly specific heuristic strategy which assumes that, when it comes to the notion of 
a permanent self, all non-Buddhist (and even some Buddhist) thinkers are wrong, 
but ultimately derive their deformed conceptions from the only correct teaching of 
tathāgatagarbha.17 Secondly, it is impossible for unenlightened beings in saṃsāra 
to recognise a self. The experience of selfhood is available only for those who attain 
enlightenment. For that reason, i.e. to guide worldly beings to nirvāṇa and make 
them discard all ideas of a mundane self, Buddha taught the doctrine of anātman as 
a skill-in-means.
15 Idem, The Term Ātman..., p. 8.
16 Translation of Guṇabhadra (T vol. 2, no. 120).
17 C.V. Jones, The Term Ātman..., pp. 9–10. We are dealing here with a kind of revisionism aimed at 
demonstrating the supremacy of MPNS over competing texts and systems of thought. While the idea of 
self in living beings is generally upheld, the notion of ātman is discarded when seen as something taught 
by non-Buddhist thinkers, but accepted after being redefined as tathāgatagarbha – an original Buddhist 
invention.
151
4. The idea of self in Śrīmālādevī-sim. hanāda-sūtra
As we shall see, the authors of ŚMS are more cautious in applying the term ātman to 
tathāgatagarbha, and in this sūtra we never encounter a simple equation of the idea 
of self and the buddha nature, nor an explicit claim that tathāgatagarbha is a true self. 
This, however, does not mean that the theory of self is absent from this sūtra. Just the 
opposite – ŚMS, just like sūtras form the MPNS group, posits a self, but does it in 
a more roundabout way. In this process, ŚMS reveals its distinct character: it upholds 
the general notion of tathāgatagarbha as self, but does so by choosing a different 
rhetoric and a distinctive pedagogical approach, especially concerning the notion of 
ātman.
To prove the above points, we shall now employ an interpretative strategy that will 
allow us to read the ŚMS in a manner consistent with the idea of tathāgatagarbha as 
a self. This will be done by analysing and coordinating five separate features of the 
sūtra.
4.1.  Tathāgatagarbha is the dharma body of buddha covered  
in defilements
Because of the said reluctance of the sūtra to equate tathāgatagarbha with ātman, we 
have to base our investigation on the straightforward identification of tathāgatagarbha 
with the buddha’s dharma body (dharmakāya).18
O Lord, it is so that the dharma body of the tathāgata when it is not free from afflictions is called 
the tathāgatagarbha.19
The sūtra does not rest with this statement. Elsewhere the dharmakāya is given four 
“perfect qualities” or “perfections of qualities” (guṇapāramitā). They are the perfection 
of purity (śubhapāramitā), pleasure (sukhapāramitā), permanence (nityapāramitā), 
and self (wo boluomi 我波羅蜜, ātmapāramitā) (T353_12:222a23–24).20 At the same 
time, tathāgatagarbha is described as garbha of the dharmakāya (fashen zang 法身藏) 
18 The English renderings of ŚMS are modified versions of D. Paul’s translations (The Sūtra of 
Queen Śrimālā of the Lion’s Roar [in:] D. Paul, J.R. McRae, The Sūtra of Queen Śrimālā of the Lion’s 
& The Vinalakīrti Sūtra, Berkeley 2004).
19 Guṇabhadra’s translation from 435 CE (T vol. 12, no. 353), 221c10–11: 世尊。如是如來法身
不離煩惱藏名如來藏。D. Paul, The Sūtra of Queen Śrimālā..., p. 44. This passage is quoted in RGVV 
12.14: bhagavaṃs tathāgatadharmakāyo ‘vinirmuktakleśakośas tathāgatagarbhaḥ sūcyate. Cf. A. Way-
man, H. Wayman, op. cit., p. 98. For Bodhiruci’s translation (703–716 CE), being a part of Ratnakūṭasūtra, 
see G.C.C. Chang (ed.), A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras, University Park & London 1983, p. 378.
20 In earlier Buddhist tradition, these four qualities were “distortions” (viparyāsa) associated with 
wrong views. For deluded beings it is a mistake to look for purity, pleasure, permanence, and self in 
saṃsāra. The correct view lies in cultivating the exact opposite notions (viparyāsaviparyaya), i.e. the 
lack of purity, pleasure etc. However, for tathāgatagarbha literature the viparyāsas are the correct at-
tributes of dharmakāya, and as such indicate right views. See RGV I, 35–36 and the subsequent com-
mentary (RGVV 30.9–18). The MPNS also uses the four viparyāsas, but ascribes them directly to the 
tathāgatagarbha, which is not surprising (C.V. Jones, Beings, Non-Beings..., p. 56).
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and the inherently pure garbha (zixing qingjing zang 自性淸淨藏) (222b22–23). 
Here the two most popular readings of garbha are applicable. If it is read as “womb,” 
then the whole compound denotes a living being having a (developed) buddha, and 
if it is read as “embryo,” it denotes a being with the buddha body in potentia. Nev-
ertheless, we know for sure that tathāgatagarbha is veiled in defilements of an ex-
trinsic nature (222b23–24), so its enlightened features – including the characteristic 
of selfhood – are not (yet) manifested. Thus the tathāgatagarbha, as it constitutes 
the saṃsāric “mode” of the enlightened buddha body, cannot represent a permanent 
and true self par excellence. For that very reason, it is not termed ātman, and, by 
the same token, only that which possesses the quality of self (and functions as such) 
is characterised as having the “perfection of self.” Here, just as with the canoni-
cal set of six or ten perfections, pāramitā must indicate an utterly refined quality. 
And just as prajñāpāramitā means a perfect wisdom resulting in enlightenment, so 
ātmapāramitā must mean excellence or – to recall the MBhS – supremacy of a per-
manent (nitya) selfhood that enables the enjoyment of deliverance. In this way, by ap-
plying the guṇapāramitās to dharmakāya and avoiding classifying tathāgatagarbha 
as ātman, ŚMS on the one hand conforms to the “law” that no self-principle can be 
recognised in the domain of saṃsāra, but on the other distinguishes itself from the 
sūtras of the MPNS group.
Because the first argument presented above is central to the whole fivefold inter-
pretative scheme, it is now necessary to summarise the whole chain of reasoning con-
tained in it. As indicated, ŚMS equates the dharmakāya, not free from afflictions, with 
tathāgatagarbha, and also calls the tathāgatagarbha a garbha of the dharmakāya. 
The sūtra predicates ātmapāramitā only of the (transcendent) dharmakāya, but 
considering the essential equality between the two, we are warranted in inferring 
that the text would countenance the predication of ātmapāramitā of (phenomenal) 
tathāgatagarbha as well, providing that this “perfection” would be understood as 
not apparent. That being said, it has to be noted that the sūtra’s treatment of the idea 
of self cannot be apprehended without referring to its description of the paradoxi-
cal pure-but-impure nature of tathāgatagarbha (222b23–24). This in turn must be 
understood in the light of a distinction between the ontological and epistemological 
levels. Thus it is essential to clarify that on the ontological level, ŚMS presupposes 
the existence of one real principle (“buddha nature”).21 Only when we turn to the 
domain of epistemology may the differentiation of this principle into its transcend-
ent/nirvāṇic (pure) and phenomenal/saṃsāric (impure) aspect take place. Thus the 
tathāgatagarbha-cum-dharmakāya is pure and equipped with ātmapāramitā only 
when perceived by enlightened beings, but when the unenlightened beings – without 
resorting to faith22 – try to grasp it, they see nothing at all, or mistake their buddha 
nature for a mundane self – impure and deprived of ātmapāramitā. It must be added 
that all remarks hinting at this seeming duality of the real principle appearing in the 
pages below should be read according to this logic.
21 See paragraph 4.2 below.
22 See paragraph 4.5 and fn. 39.
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4.2. Tathāgatagarbha is the basis for phenomenal reality
The next step in promoting the idea of self in ŚMS lies in assigning a crucial meta-
physical function to the dharmakāya-tathāgatagarbha – that of a substratum under-
pinning phenomenal reality.
Tathāgatagarbha is separated (li 離) from the characteristic (xiang 相) of the conditioned 
(youwei 有爲). It is eternal (chang zhu 常住), unchanging (bubian 不變), and for that rea-
son it is the basis (yi 依), the support (chi 持), and the foundation (jianli 建立). O Lord, the 
tathāgatagarbha is not separate, not severed, and not liberated from the inconceivable dharmas 
of the buddha. O Lord, it is a basis, support, and foundation for the conditioned dharmas that 
are severed, separate, and different from the dharmas of the buddha.23
Here the sūtra uses the term tathāgatagarbha, but it is clear that – since it is 
considered unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and has the many qualities of a buddha – it 
must still denote the tathāgatagarbha-cum-enlightened dharma body. In this passage, 
tathāgatagarbha is established as support for all phenomenal reality: every aspect of 
the conditioned (saṃskṛta) sphere, including living beings, is based on it. The above 
passage needs to be read together with a different statement according to which all 
conditioned phenomena are impermanent (wu chang 無常) and of a false (xu 虚) and 
deceptive (wang 妄) nature, and therefore are not to be considered real (fei di 非諦) 
(221c25–28). Thus, because only dharmakāya, being the “sphere of nirvāṇa” (niepan 
jie 涅槃界), is truly unconditioned, we must conclude that, according to ŚMS, the 
dharmakāya constitutes the only permanent and true reality. This view seems to have 
its roots in the thought of the Lokottaravāda branch of the Mahāsāṃghika school. 
Lokottaravādins were the only school that posited unconditioned or transcendent 
(lokottara) dharmas as the sole truly existing reality. This is important inasmuch as 
Mahāsāṃghikas from the Āndhra region are the most likely candidates for the au-
thorship of ŚMS and other tathāgatagarbha sūtras.24
4.3. Tathāgatagarbha is the basis for saṃsāra. Diachronic factor (I)
Next, the sūtra expounds that tathāgatagarbha-dharmakāya serves as a kind of plat-
form for the cycle of birth and death of living beings.
O World Honored One, the cycle of birth and death (shengsi 生死) rests (yi 依) upon the 
tathāgatagarbha, because the tathāgatagarbha is the original reality [enlightenment] (benji 
23 ŚMS T353_12:222b10–14: 非如來藏有生有死。如來藏者離有爲相。如來藏常住不變。 是
故如來藏。是依是持是建立。世尊。不離不斷不脱不異不思議佛法。世尊。斷脱異外有爲法
依持建立者。是如來藏。For this and two other passages translated below see D. Paul, The Sūtra of 
Queen Śrimālā..., p. 53; cf. A. Wayman, H. Wayman, op. cit., pp. 104–105; G.C.C. Chang, op. cit., p. 38.
24 A. Wayman, H. Wayman, op. cit., pp. 1–3; A. Wayman, The Mahāsāṃghika and the Tathāgata-
garbha, “Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies” 1978, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 42–43; 
S. Hodge, On the Eschatology of the Mahāparinirvaṇa-Sūtra and Related Matters, Lecture held at Uni-
versity of London, SOAS, 2006, http://www.nirvanasutra.net/historicalbackground2.htm [accessed: 
16 January 2017]; A.W. Barber, Two Mahāyāna Developments along the Krishna River [in:] Buddhism in 
the Krishna River Valley of Andhra, S. Padma, A.W. Barber (eds.), New York 2008, pp. 151–167.
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本際), which is unknowable. [...] O Lord, saṃsāra is the extinction (mo 沒) of senses and in 
the next phase the arising (qi 起) of unexperienced senses. This is called the cycle of birth and 
death. O Lord, the two dharmas of birth (sheng 生) and death (si 死) are the tathāgatagarbha. It 
is only a convention to say that there is death and birth. Death is the extinction of senses, birth is 
the arising of new ones. But the tathāgatagarbha is not born and does not die.25
While the saṃsāra consist of a constant repetition of arising and extinction of 
dharmas, the tathāgatagarbha is something that simultaneously participates in phe-
nomenal reality (“Birth and death are the tathāgatagarbha”) and transcends it (“The 
tathāgatagarbha is not born and does not die”). In other words, it serves as an alter-
native designation for the whole reality, perceived here in two aspects, i.e. the cy-
cle of birth and death and nirvāṇa. Naturally, the view expressed in the above passage 
is one of the existence of a sole permanent principle: the buddha. From the standpoint 
of the ultimate (paramārtha) – and when we bear in mind the duality of conditioned 
(unreal) and unconditioned (real) – the participation of tathāgatagarbha in the trans-
migratory cycle is just as illusory as that cycle itself, and appears as something per-
formed only for the sake of beings entrapped in it. However, for those beings who 
believe in it, tathāgatagarbha is the buddha-element within that serves as a platform 
for the process of renewing of sense organs in repeated existences. This allows us to 
call tathāgatagarbha a diachronic principle sustaining the identity of living beings in 
the transmigratory cycle.
4.4.  Tathāgatagarbha is that which strives for nirvāṇa.  
Diachronic factor (II)
In order to keep a balanced account of the tathāgatagarbha as a self, the sūtra also 
accentuates its psychological side.
If there were no tathāgatagarbha, there would be no detest (yan 厭) for pain and pleasure (kule 
苦樂), nor a wish (qiu 求) for nirvāṇa.26
Here we find justification for positing tathāgatagarbha as an element upon which 
world weariness and desire for salvation is imprinted. Its existence is necessary 
because the mental components of a living being are of momentary nature and it 
is impossible for them to be sufficiently affected with suffering. These mental ele-
ments are listed as seven dharmas (qi fa 七法): six sense consciousnesses (liushi 六
識) and the accompanying knowledge of the mental phenomena (xinfa zhi 心法智) 
(222b16–17). It turns out that tathāgatagarbha fulfils the function of self not only 
25 ŚMS T353_12:222b05–10: 世尊。生死者依如來藏。以如來藏故。説本際不可知。世尊。 
[...] 世尊。生死。生死者。諸受根沒。次第不受根起。是名生死。世尊。死生者此二法是如來藏。 
世間言説故。有死有生。死者謂根壞。生者新諸根起。非如來藏有生有死。
26 ŚMS T535_12:222b14–15: 若無如來藏者。不得厭苦樂求涅槃。Quoted in RGVV 36.1–2, but 
the śāstra is more elaborate. It says that without the tathāgatagarbha there would be no desire (icchā) 
and no wish (prārthanā) for nirvāṇa, nor a vow (praṇidhi) for it. It also clarifies that “desire” denotes 
here the “lack of cowardliness” (asaṃkoca) in attaining the intended object, “wish” means “searching 
for” (parimārgaṇa), and “vow” stands for “will” (cetanā) of the mind (36.5–7).
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in the way discussed above, but also as a principle consciously striving for a way to 
end suffering.
From the previous analysis (4.1–4.4), we can conclude the following. On the on-
tological level, tathāgatagarbha constitutes all reality in two aspects. This entails its 
diachronic function as a factor not only supporting the cycle of rebirth, but also mak-
ing it possible to keep the identity of beings in the cycle of saṃsāra. On the psycho-
logical level, tathāgatagarbha is responsible for seeking enlightenment and carrying 
the incentive of further practice into the next life. In other words, it is the buddha in 
potentia that strives to attain the developed form of dharmakāya.
As a permanent factor, tathāgatagarbha seems to operate beyond the five skand-
has, and as such has no counterpart in the thought of early Buddhism. However, on 
the saṃsāric level it could be interpreted as assuming the diachronic function of 
mind (citta) or consciousness (vijñāna). Such a function of consciousness was known 
already in the early Buddhist nikāyas. In the context of the law of dependent origina-
tion (pratītyasamutpāda), it is sometimes stated that “name and form” (nāmarūpa) 
and viññāṇa condition each other, and as such constitute a basis for the subsequent 
existence (SN II, 104).27 Elsewhere it is said that viññāṇa is a factor connecting the 
previous life to a present one, because by entering the mother’s womb it causes 
nāmarūpa to be reborn (DN II, 63).28 In the same vein, SN II, 65 explicitly states that 
renewed existence in the future is caused by an established consciousness.29 A similar 
diachronic function is given to citta. In SN V, 369–370 a certain Mahānāma is reas-
sured by the Buddha that his mind, refined by practice, will “go to distinction” after 
his death.30 These two factors, however, have a feature that differentiates them from 
tathāgatagarbha. Even if they are responsible for future rebirths, viññāṇa and citta 
are dependent on nāmarūpa, and are thus devoid of permanence. Being subjected to 
constant change, they are not to be identified with a stable transmigrating principle, 
such as ātman.31 As we have seen, the tathāgatagarbha – unconditioned, equipped 
with perfections of permanence and self – escapes such limitations.
In AAN, a different sūtra from the TGS group, the diachronic function of 
tathāgatagarbha is presented in a much simpler and direct way. AAN directly 
equates tathāgatagarbha with the enlightened body of the buddha,32 and declares that 
when the dharmakāya in a state of defilement comes and goes through life and death 
(往來生死, gaticyutyupapattiṣu saṃcaran) from beginningless (anavarāgra) times, 
it is termed (living) beings (sattvadhātu) (T668_16:467b06–08).33 The further part of 
this passage, which concerns tathāgatagarbha in beings, bodhisattvas, and buddhas, 
is cited in full by RGVV 40.16–41.5, but not commented upon. It seems that RGV 
27 B. Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, Boston 2000, p. 602.
28 M. Walshe, The Long Discourses of the Buddha, Boston 1995, pp. 225–226.
29 B. Bodhi, op. cit., p. 576.
30 Ibidem, p. 1808.
31 Tse-fu Kuan, Mindfulness in Early Buddhism, London & New York 2008, pp. 123–124.
32 In Bodhiruci’s translation (T vol. 16, no. 668), AAN 467a18–19: 如來藏者即是法身。 
“Tathāgatagarbha is precisely the dharma body” (quoted in RGVV 2.11–13); see J.A. Silk, op. cit., p. 94.
33 Quoted in RGVV 40.16–18, see ibidem, pp. 103–104.
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in general is not especially concerned with the issue at hand. However, it does cite 
another passage with a similar overtone. It comes from a certain Ṣadāyatanasūtra, 
now lost. This text mentions a germ (gotra)34 which from beginningless times 
(anādikālika) moves through saṃsāra, assuming different forms of living beings 
with six sense organs (55.16–17).
Since the tathāgatagarbha in ŚMS works as a self responsible for the continuity 
of existence, it clearly shares some features with the Yogācāra concept of “store-
house consciousness” (ālayavijñāna). Tathāgatagarbha’s function as the foundation 
for conditioned dharmas resembles ālayavijñāna as a “storehouse” of sensory input 
and karmic dispositions that serve as a source for the projection of phenomenal real-
ity. This fact is well illustrated in a much later sūtra, the Laṅkāvatāra, a scripture that 
famously conflates the two ideas in question. The said process is reflected in the Chi-
nese translation of this text, which uses zang 藏 for both tathāgatagarbha (rulaizang 
如來藏) and ālayavijñāna (shizang 識藏).35 However, taking only the early Yogācāra 
and Tathāgatagarbha scriptures (Yogācārabhūmi, Saṃdhinirmocana, RGV) into con-
sideration, these two concepts can be differentiated in clear terms.36 Tathāgatagarbha 
is unconditioned, inherently pure, and serves as a basis for all phenomenal reality. 
Ālaya, while serving as a similar kind of foundation, is nevertheless dependent on 
the remaining seven consciousnesses and inherently stained. Its purification, known 
as the “transformation of the basis” (āśrayaparāvṛtti), means a radical change of 
ālaya’s character, while in the context of tathāgatagarbha āśrayaparivṛtti it indi-
cates only a refinement of the very same permanent principle (RGVV 21.9–10).37 
Moreover, whereas in the early buddha nature literature the diachronic function of 
tathāgatagarbha adds to its overall characteristic as a self, in the context of Yogācāra 
interpreting ālayavijñāna as self is considered a serious error of the distorted mind 
(kliṣṭamanas). This feature is a good touchstone for differentiating both systems of 
thought in the era before the fourth or fifth centuries CE, when they were first syn-
thesised in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.
4.5. Tathāgatagarbha is not a mundane self
We must now turn to the last step in the proposed fivefold strategy, which allows us 
to interpret tathāgatagarbha as self in ŚMS. Having characterised it as a permanent 
world-weary and enlightenment-seeking principle, the sūtra warns against recognis-
ing tathāgatagarbha as a notion equal to various conceptions of selfhood, such as 
ātman (wo 我), living being (zhongsheng 衆生), soul (ming 命), and person (ren 人) 
34 In RGV the term gotra is often used to mean “cause” (hetu), e.g. in I, 150 where it is said to be the 
element from which the three bodies of the buddha are obtained. In this aspect, gotra clearly corresponds 
with (tathāgata)garbha as hetu of future buddhahood, e.g. in I, 27–28.
35 D. Paul, The Concept of Tathāgatagarbha in the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra (Sheng-man Ching), “Journal 
of the American Oriental Society” 1979, vol. 99, no. 2, p. 192.
36 For an account of the early sources on ālayavijñāna see W.S. Waldron, The Buddhist Unconscious, 
London 2003, pp. 91–127.
37 Cf. J. Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), Rome 1966, p. 187, fn. 6.
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(T353_12:222b19–20). It could be argued that the sole fact of correlating the wrong 
notions of selfhood, especially ātman, with the tathāgatagarbha may imply that there 
must be a fundamental similarity (of function) between them. Thus a warning against 
the possibility of confusing them. Of course, it has to be asked why ŚMS negates 
tathāgatagarbha the quality of ātman, while assigning the perfection of self to the 
enlightened buddha body.
As we have seen, MPNS and MBhS state that there is a “Buddhist self,” and are 
in agreement that this self is transcendent, which means that it is of purely nirvāṇic 
character and is to be recognised only by enlightened beings. Therefore, according 
to MPNS, the Buddha taught the principle of anātman as an upāya in order to wean 
people away from the notion of a false worldly self, and only when they were able 
to accept the higher teachings did he expound the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha as 
the true ātman. We have observed that MPNS accepts both the notion of a (true) self 
and the term ātman to denote it. But this particular strategy is effective only because 
in this sūtra the term ātman was redefined to indicate the correct notion of selfhood, 
i.e. tathāgatagarbha. According to MPNS, the idea of ātman was designed to mean 
“buddha nature,” but over the course of time it was distorted by the tīrthikas, so re-
turning to the use of this term as an indicator of the true notion of self must have felt 
a fully justified step. However, in the ŚMS – a sūtra stemming from a different strand 
of Indian tathāgatagarbha thought – ātman remains an iconic example of a mistaken 
notion of selfhood, i.e. a mundane self. It is an utterly erroneous concept giving 
a false sense of identity and generating attachment. For this reason, tathāgatagarbha 
is denied the status of ātman, and even the enlightened body of the buddha is not 
termed as such, but is given the perfection of self. It seems that this move was dic-
tated just as much by the necessity to underline the transcendence of the true self 
(dharmakāya) as by the need to avoid the use of the term ātman for any entity. It is 
therefore justified to conclude that, on a philosophical level, ŚMS conforms to the 
MPNS notion of the “buddha within” as the true self of living beings, but chooses 
a distinct pedagogical approach resulting in different use of categories.
This attitude is very much in tune with the sutra’s overall inclination towards 
presenting its essentially non-dualistic teaching through antithetical categories. This 
strategy primarily uses the opposition between impure and pure. The impure is al-
ways bonded with the saṃsāric, whereas the pure is always nirvāṇic. And so ŚMS 
contrasts the conditioned, impermanent and false with the unconditioned, permanent 
and true,38 the latent state of ignorance (wuming zhudi 無明住地, avidyāvāsabhūmi) 
with the buddha’s wisdom (220a12–15), the ultimate refuge (Buddha) with the lim-
ited refuges (Dharma and Saṅgha) (221a02–18),39 and the lack of self with the perfec-
tion of self. A special case is made of the pair tathāgatagarbha / dharmakāya: both 
are inherently pure, and differentiated only by the unreal adventitious defilements40 
38 In the context of the only unconditioned and thus permanent & true Noble Truth of the extinction 
of suffering: ŚMS T353_12:221c25–28, 222a01–03.
39 See also RGV I, 20–21 and commentary.
40 The inability of unenlightened beings to understand this paradox is a strong notion running through 
ŚMS and RGV. See ŚMS T353_12:222c03–07 (also RGV I, 25 and subsequent commentary [RGVV 
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which assign them to the pure or impure realm. Thus the dharmakāya working (as 
tathāgatagarbha) within saṃsāra is not-self, but its full form of a permanent self can 
be revealed through the destruction of taints.
The last step in our fivefold interpretative strategy is closely related to the 
first. ŚMS warns against equating tathāgatagarbha with different notions of self (in-
cluding ātman), but the reason for this is, of course, not the sūtra’s denial of a true 
self, but its insistence on the fact that although the true self is always present, it is un-
recognisable on the level of mundane existence by unenlightened beings. Enlighten-
ment, however, which is not a destruction of dharmas, but the gaining of dharmakāya 
(221c07–11),41 seems to be a realised state of selfhood (ātmapāramitā) that enjoys 
the many buddha qualities. This very state is also the realisation of the wisdom of 
emptiness (śūnyatā) in a model proposed by the sūtra itself, where tathāgatagarbha 
is interpreted as being free from defilements (śūnya), but full of enlightened attri-
butes (aśūnya) (221c12–23).
5. Conclusions
While the Indian tathāgatagarbha sūtras belonging to the MPNS group are the main 
exponents of the idea of buddha nature as a true self, ŚMS, coming from a different 
offshoot of tathāgatagarbha texts, can also be interpreted as successfully supporting 
this claim. Working with slightly different categories and applying distinct herme-
neutics to the Buddhist tradition, ŚMS combines the theory of a “Buddhist self” with 
a more sensitive approach to the conventional anātmavāda position.
To “extract” the discourse on self from the sūtra it was necessary to introduce 
a five-step interpretative strategy. First of all (4.1), we have established that ŚMS 
proposes a fundamental equality between the enlightened body of the buddha, hav-
ing the perfection of self with the notion of “buddha within” (tathāgatagarbha), 
being a “mode” of the buddha body in saṃsāra. This, however, does not mean that 
tathāgatagarbha constitutes a mundane self in the phenomenal realm, because its 
equivalence with the dharmakāya on an ontological level is somewhat “nullified” 
by the cognitive (epistemic) discrepancies between buddhas and unenlightened 
beings. For this reason, the tathāgatagarbha cannot be recognised as wielding the 
quality of ātmapāramitā by beings still trapped in saṃsāra. For them, the only way 
to get in contact with the true self is through faith in buddha’s words.
The second and third step entailed constituting tathāgatagarbha as a basis for 
the conditioned phenomenal reality (4.2) and cycle of rebirth (4.3). This choice was 
something the authors of the ŚMS inherited from their Mahāsāṃghika background. 
Every aspect of phenomenal, saṃsāric reality rests upon the unconditioned and 
nirvāṇic. If what is asaṃskṛta is permanent and real, and if the realm of nirvāṇa is 
only a different designation for the dharma body of the buddha, this means that the 
21.17–22.4]) where it is said that only tathāgatas and highly developed bodhisattvas can understand this 
issue. The rest must resort to faith (xin 信).
41 See also RGVV 12.10–14 starting with na khalu bhagavan dharmavināśo duḥkhanirodhaḥ.
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tathāgatagarbha-cum-dharmakāya constitutes the only permanent reality. This un-
conditioned principle sustains the conditioned sphere of all phenomena and provides 
continuation for the illusory human experience as long as it is necessary for the “bud-
dha within” to gain full selfhood.
The fourth step (4.4) of our method established the said principle as that which 
detests saṃsāra and strives for nirvāṇa. By combining this idea with previous argu-
ments it was possible to disclose tathāgatagarbha as a stable principle asserting the 
diachronic continuity of a living being and its original identity of a changeless buddha.
The fifth step (4.5) confirmed that in the ŚMS there can be no equivalence be-
tween tathāgatagarbha as a true self and the idea of a mundane self (ātman). What’s 
more, as indicated earlier (4.1), in ŚMS the label “ātman” may be used only as a part 
of the compound ātmapāramitā, denoting the fully enlightened buddha body. Thus, 
while ŚMS recognises the absence of a worldly self just as the sūtras from MPNS 
group, it also denies tathāgatagarbha the right to wield the label “ātman.” This re-
veals that the sūtra regards both the notion of a mundane self and the term indicating 
it as invalid. Such an attitude, clearly more conservative than the one presented by 
MPNS, might have been a natural development in the alternative, independent strain 
of Indian tathāgatagarbha thought represented by ŚMS, but it is also possible that 
the authors of the sūtra knew of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine in MPNS42 and con-
sciously decided not to draw on solutions that seemed too unorthodox.
Finally, something remains to be said about the narrative strategy of ŚMS, which, 
simultaneously, influences and reflects its pedagogical stance. The sūtra’s viewpoint 
is that of ultimate reality, i.e. dharmakāya; this entails a strong notion of “automa-
tism,” in which living beings are objectified as “areas of work” for the buddha-prin-
ciple rather than treated as autonomous subjects.43 A great effort on their part, except 
for having faith, is not needed for the plan of salvation to work. This is in conformity 
with the sūtra’s teachings on “one vehicle” (ekayāna), according to which all beings 
possessing tathāgatagarbha will surely reach nirvāṇa (220c19–26). For this reason, 
the text may give an impression that ultimately it is the “buddha within” that provides 
an incentive to undertake practice, strives for enlightenment, while sustaining the 
identity of beings in consecutive rebirths, reaches maturity by acquiring the dharma 
body, and overcomes the illusion of phenomenal reality. Such perspective might sug-
gest that beings are deprived of personal karmic responsibilities, but – in the light of 
the above discussion – it would be better seen as a by-product of the buddha-oriented 
perspective influencing the sūtra’s dominant soteriological and pedagogical import 
that promotes the certainty of enlightenment for all and the ultimate equality of Bud-
dha and the “I.”
42 See C.V. Jones, Beings, Non-Beings..., p. 57.
43 Cf. M. Zimmermann, The Process of Awakening in Early Texts on Buddha-Nature in India [in:] 
A Distant Mirror, L. Chen-kuo, M. Radich (eds.), Hamburg 2014, pp. 525–527.
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